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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Rl'~~ELL \V·. YOlTNG and 
~-L:\B-6.-\ (). Yl)lTNG, his \vife, 
... 4p pella11fs, 
i~L\TIS 1-I.\XSl~~X and 
BOXXIE H~~XSEN, his \vife, 
Respondents. 
7 4~() 
Brief of Respondents 
This action, being No. 87,190 in the trial court, \Yas 
commenced by plaintiffs in an attempt to relitigate, by 
changes in allegations, the jssues \vhich had already hecn 
presented and determined in case No. 85,678. In other 
words, instead of appealing from the adverse decree antl 
judgment in the original case, plaintiff attempted to 
refile the case. Defendants, in their answer, pleaded the 
findings of fact, conclusions of la\v and judgment in the 
former case as res adjudicata of the issues and plaintiffs 
thereupon interposed a demurrer and motion to strike; 
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and at tlll' hearing stated to the court that in the event 
the demurrer \vas overruled and the motion to strike 
denied that a judgment of dismissal of the case would 
be in order as they had no defense to those issues as 
presented hy defendants. 
rl1ha t the t\\·o cases were the same is evident from a 
reading < >f the pleadings. They both are an attempt on 
the .part of plaintiffs to secure redress for what they 
regard as a breach of contract on the part of defendants. 
The contract is the same in each case; they arise out of 
the sa.rne transaction ; the alleged breach is the same ; and 
all issues as to rights and liabilities of the parties \vere 
either raised in ihe first case or should or could have 
been presented in that case. Of course, some of the 
issues presented in the first ease were raised by the 
ans-vver of defendants, but those issues were nevertheless 
presente<l in the first case and determined by the court in 
the first case. 
Let us, therefore, take a look at the issues presented 
in thP two cases. 
FIRST CASE 
Plan tiff's alleged legal ownership by defendants of 
certain real property; that it vvas capable of being 
farmed and of having pigs, ehickens and rabbits raised 
thereon; and that defendants had urged plaintiffs to 
move upon the property with defendants and enter into 
a partnership with plaintiffs for operation of the farm. 
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That on or about ~lay 14, 1948 plaintiffs and defend-
ants made an oral contract that plaintiffs should pay 
defendants $9000.00 for an undivided one-half interest in 
the real property and personal property, including live-
stock thereon; that plaintiffs ,,,.ere to move on the· prop-
erty with defendants and that the $9000.00 should be paid 
'vhen plaintiffs sold their home at 3348 South State 
Street, and if it 'vas not sold by Nov. 15, 1948, that plain-
tiffs were to pay $50.00 per month until it was sold, the 
same to apply on the purchase priee; that there was a 
$2,000 mortgage on defendants' farm, which defendants 
""ere to clear, and upon payment of the $9,000 that the 
one-half interest was to be clear. 
That in July 1948 plaintiffs paid defendants $4,000, 
securing the same by a mortgage on their State Street 
house, whereupon it was alleged that the oral agreement 
was modified and that the defendants were to immedi-
ately execute the deed for the one-half interest and exe-
eute a bill of sale for the one-half interest in the personal 
property and execute a partnership agreement with 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also alleged that by certain minor 
purchases they were to have an additional credit of 
$60.00 on the purchase price. 
It is further alleged that defendants did not g1ve 
plaintiffs the deed and made excuses for their failure so 
to do; that plaintiffs moved onto the property and per-
formed their part of the partnership agreement by buy-
ing grain, etc., doing work in taking care of the livestock 
and put in about 400 hours of labor upon the premises. 
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That defendants agreed that if plaintiff would wait until 
November 15, 1948 they would then execute deed and bill 
of sale and have the other agreements drawn up. That on 
or about February 15, 1949 defendants refused to exe-
cute the deeds and partnership agreement and refused to 
execute any papers· carrying· out the agreement and de-
manded that plaintiffs leave the premises. 
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had breached the 
contract and demanded damages as follows : 
a. For the sum of $4060.00. 
b. Interest thereon at 6%. 
c. The value of the labor expended by Mr. Young 
in the sum of $472.50. 
d. Cost of moving to the premises, $100.00 .. 
e. Moneys advanced f.or a saw, $53.00. 
f. Further moneys advanced in the sum of $161.37. 
g. Money advanced for purchase of a trailer, $16.00. 
h. Money advanced to assist in payment of taxes, 
$37.01. 
1. Cash advanced for payment of labor, $53.50. 
Plaintiffs further alleged that they had demanded 
payment from defendants of said amounts, but defend-
ants had failed and defused to pay. 
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By defendants' nns\Yer they admitted ow1ung the 
real property; admitted that it \Vas eapnble of being 
.. farmed; admitted that they discussed \Yith plaintiffs the 
formation of a partnership; admitted making an oral 
agTeement \Yith plaintiffs for the sale to plaintiffs of a 
one-half interest in the real estate and personal property 
for $9,000.00 to be paid on or before November 15, 1948; 
admitted receipt of the $4,060 on the purchase price; ad-
mitted that the balance was to come from a sale of the 
State Street home of plaintiffs but that the balance was 
to be payable in any eYent on or before November 15, 
1948; and alleged that in the meantime it was a part of 
the agreement that they would operate the farm as a 
joint enterprise and sell and dispose of the products, con-
tributing equally in labor and cost of the operations and 
dividing equally the net proceeds. Defendants further 
admitted that the farm had a mortgage on it in the sum 
of $1600.00, and that they were to convey the one-half 
interest free and clear of lien and that they used a 
portion of the $4,000 received from plaintiffs to clear the 
mortgage. Defendants admitted that plaintiffs had gone 
into possession of an apartment on the premises, and al-
leged that the parties had operated the farm as a j'oint 
enterprise and had sold the livestock and chickens and 
other salable products and had applied the proceeds to 
the expenses of operations and had equally divided the 
balance. Defendants denied that the contract was modi-
fied in July 1948, as alleged by plaintiffs, and alleged 
that it was understood and agreed at that time that the 
balance of the purchase price was to be paid on or about 
November 15, 1948. On the other hand defendants alleged 
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that when November 15, 1948 came the- plaintiffs failed 
and refused to pay the balance- of the purchase price and 
breached the agreement in that regard and then 
and there notified defendants that they did not 
intend to pay the balance and did not intend to go ahead 
with the formation of the partnership and did not intend 
to engage in the joint operation of the farm, and did not 
inte·nd to render any further services in the operation 
of the farm, and did not intend to and would not be re-
sponsible for any further debts or obligations which 
might be incurred for the restocking of the farm with 
livestock or poultry, and on the contrary demanded that 
they be reimbursed for their expenditures and that 
$4,000 be returned to them. 
Defendants denied that they had breached the con-
tract as alleged by plaintiffs and alleged that the· contract 
was breached by plaintiffs and alleged that plaintiffs had 
breached the contract by failing and refusing to pay the 
balance on the purchase price and by repudiating the 
agreement and by refusing to further ·participate in the 
operation of the farm. That if plaintiffs were damaged 
it was due to their own misconduct in breaching the con-
tract and in refusing to go ahead and in demanding a 
return of their invested funds. 
Upon these issues the case was tried. T_he issues 
were found in favor of defendants and findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment were entered, all of 
which are made a part of the answer of defendants in 
the second case. 
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SECOND CASE 
Thereupon the plaintiffs, before and instead of ap-
pealing as they haYe no'v done in the first case, filed a 
second case. 
The only difference between the second case and the 
first case is that plaintiffs allege in the· second case that 
a partnership 'Yas formed by the agreement in May, 1948. 
That the real and personal property belonged to the 
partnership. That plaintiffs paid the sum of $4,060.00 on 
the purchase price of a one-half interest in the partner-
ship, the balance to be payable on or about Nov. 15, 1948 
from the sale of their State Street home, and if not sold 
by Nov. 15, 1948 that the balance was to be payable a~ the 
rate of $50.00 per month, and that in the- meantime the 
plaintiff ''as to receive a deed and bill of sale for the· one-
half interest, and that defendants refused to make the 
deed, bill of sale, and prepare and execute the necessary 
partnership papers. That it is impossible for the parties 
to settle their differences and the personal property of 
the partnership has been sold and no accounting had. 
They pray for a dissolution of the partnership and an 
accounting had; that the partnership property be sold 
and that the surplus be divided between the parties. 
To this complaint in the second case the defendants 
interposed the same defenses which were pleaded in the 
first case and in addition pleaded res adjudicata, attach-
ing copies of the pleadings, findings of fact and judgment 
in the first case to the answer. 
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When plaintiffs' demurrer to the defense of res 
adjudicata was overruled and their motion to strike that 
defense was denied they stated that they could not go to 
trial and that a judgment of dismissal of the second case 
was in order and appropriate in view of the decision of 
the court on the demurrer and motion. 
This appeal is from the order of the court in over-
ruling the demurrer of plaintiffs to the plea of res ad-
judicata and from the order of the court in denying the 
motion to strike the same., and upon that basis in entering 
the judgment of dismissal thereon. 
Plaintiff's position, as we understand it, is that the 
trial court erred in overruling the demurrer and in deny-
ing the motion to strike. Since the judgment of dismissal 
was entered at their own suggestion after the court had 
so ruled, they are not appealing from the action of the trial 
court in dismis~ing the case after making the ruling. In 
other words, they regard the issue of res adjudicata ~s a 
complete defense if it is good, and if it is not good it has 
no place in the answer. 
The question, then, is as to whether the first case, on 
the issues framed by the pleadings and the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and judgment on thos·e issues, 
stands as an adjudication of the rights of the parties, 
subject only to the right of appeal in the first case. 
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POINT I 
RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS ACTION. 
ARGU~fENT 
The only difference bet,veen the two cases is the 
change of position taken by plaintiffs. In the first ease 
they alleged the oral contract in 1\lay, 1948, said that it 
'vas for purchase of a one half interest in the real prop-
ert:~ a.n~ for the formation of a partnership, the terms to 
be later agreed upon, "'"hen the payments were to be 
made, w·hat "~as done and to be done by the respective 
parties; that the defendants breached the contract and 
that they wanted their money back plus damages for the 
breach. Defendants pleaded the May, 1948 contract, what 
was done and to be done by the parties thereunder, the 
relationship of the parties under the. contract, what was 
done with the jointly owned personal property, who 
breached the contract and denied any liability to plain-
tiffs for any breach of the contract and alleged that the 
plaintiffs were the wrong-doers. 
In the second case the plaintiffs allege the same con-
tract, the same payments by themselves, the same 
breaches by defendants, and the same facts as those al-
leged in the first case, excepting that in the second case 
they allege that the contract was not one of purchase 
and sale of real and personal property with ali agreement 
to make a partnership, as alleged in the first case, but 
was in fact a partnership agreement. 
In both cases the issues were: What was the agree-
ment between the parties; "\vha.t was their relationship; 
what became of the property; who breached the agree-
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ment; what are the liabilities of the parties by rea-
son thereof~ 
All of those matters were fully litigated in the first 
case and all of those issues were presented by the plead-
ings and dete-rmined by the court in the first case. 
It will be observed by the court that in the first 
case plaintiffs alleged when the partnership was to be 
formed and how the parties were to operate until the 
plaintiffs paid the $9,000 in full. Defendants, by their 
pleadings in the first case, likewise pleaded when the 
partnership was to be formed, how they were to operate 
pending payment of the one-half interest, what the rela-
tionship of the parties was, what the parties did with the 
personal property which they jointly owned and disposed 
of; and where the breach occurred. All of those issues 
were heard and determined in the first case. 
Plaintiffs now contend that they can relitigate those 
same issues by changing their position in the second case 
from a contract for purchase and sale of real and per-
sonal property, with an agreement to make a partner-
ship in the future, to a position that the partnership was 
formed in the first instance and with the real and per-
sonal property as partnership property. 
In other words, plaintiffs contend that they can 
relitigate an action for breach of contract, involving a 
construction of the contract, and involving the rights and 
liabilities of the parties arising out of the contract and 
the alleged breaches thereof, as often as the parties 
10 
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change their minds as to what their relationship really 
'YaS. 
Such is not the la"" in the State of Utah. 
When a party to a contract decides. that his rights 
thereunder have been violated and that he is entitled to 
damages for its breach, and when both parties plead 
fully with reference to all of the issues thereunder, that 
ends the matter excepting for a motion for new trial and 
appeal. You cannot take as many bites of the apple as 
your change of whim or second guessing or more mature 
reflection suggests. If such were not the case litigation 
would never end and rights and liabilities would never 
come to rest between the parties. 
This court has so held in many cases. 
We shall not burden the court with all of the deci-
sions of this court on the subject. The doctrine of res 
adjudicata is, of course, comprehended within' the rule 
against splitting causes of action. Section 104-6-1, Chap-
ter 6, U.C.A. 1943, provides that the pleadings are the 
formal allegations of the parties of their respective 
claims and defenses for the judgment of the court. 
Sec. 104-7-2 provides what the complaint shall con-
t3:in, including a statement of the fac.ts constituting the 
cause of action of plaintiff, and the demand for relief 
which he claims. 
Sec. 104-7-3 provides that a plaintiff may join in the 
same complaint as many causes of action as he feels that 
11 
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he has arising out of the same transaction or transactions, 
legal and equitable, including actions upon contract, 
express or implied, and including also claims to real and 
personal property and damages for the withholding 
thereof. He may plead in the alternative or set up his 
cause of action in separate counts. 
Section 104-9-1 provides what the answer shall con-
tain, including allegations of new matter and counter-
claims. 
Section 104-9-3 provides that if the defendant fails 
to set up in his counterclaim in all matters pertaining to 
the subje:ct matter of the action or arising out of the same 
transaction that he and his assignees are thereafter 
barred from asserting the same. 
Liberal provisions are made in Chapter 14, Section 
104-14-1, 104-14-2, 104-14-3 and 104-14-4 for the amend-
ment of pleadings. A plaintiff may even dismiss his ease 
and start over, if, as here, no counterclaim has been plead-
ed, at any time before the case is submitted and decided. 
All of those provisions are for the purpose of hav-
ing cases fully presented, fully litigated in one proceed-
ing, and then set at rest, subject only to a motion for new 
trial, one of the grounds of which is newly discovered 
evidence, and he may thereafter appeal. 
What is the value of all of this if it results in noth-
ing-no adjudication that is binding on the parties-no 
determination of the issues involved, no finality that can-
12 
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not be undone by the simple method of plaintiff changing 
his position or his view as to his relationship under the 
contract? 
The general rule is well stated in 30 Am. Juris. 920-
925, as follows : 
Section 178 (Judgments) 
''It is a fundamental principle of jurispru-
dence that material facts or questions which were 
in issue in a former action, and were there ad-
mitted or judicially determined, are conclusively 
settled by a judgment rendered therein, and that 
such facts or questions become res judicata and 
may not again be litigated in a subsequent action 
between the same parties or their privies, regard-
less of the form the issue may take in the subse-
quent action whether the subsequent action 
involves the same or a different form of 
proceeding, or whether the second action is 
upon the same or a different cause of action, sub-
ject matter, claim, or demand, as the earlier action. 
In such cases, it is also immaterial that the two 
actions are based on different grounds, or tried 
on different theories, or instituted for different 
p'ltrposes and seek different relief." 
Section 179. 
''The phase of the doctrine of res judicata 
precluding subsequent litigation of the same cause 
of action is much broader in its application than 
a determination of the questions involved in the 
prior action; the conclusiveness of the judgment in 
such case extends not only to matters actually 
determined, but also to other matters which could 
properly have been determined in the prior action. 
This rule applies to every question falling within 
the purview of the original action, in respect to 
matters of both claim and defense, which could 
13 
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have been presented by the exercise of due dili-
gence.'' 
These principles are also recognized and established · 
by decisions of this court. 
The- most recent case is Matthews v. Matthews, 102 
Utah 428, 132 Pac. 2d 111. The case involved rights and 
defenses arising out of purported contracts, relation-
ships, releases and conveyances, all of which had been 
before the court in a former case. This court sustained 
the plea of res adjudicata in the following language: 
"In his brief on appeal, appellant enumerates 
several contentions, but they are all resolved in 
the question of res adjudicata. A careful examina-
tion of the record herein and the decision in the 
cases of Klein v. Matthews and Matthews et al v. 
Garcia, reported jointly in 99 Utah 398, 106 P. 
2d 773, discloses that the property described and 
the subject matter referred to in plaintiff's com-
plaint in this action is the same property and the 
same subject matter involved in both of these 
cases; that the plaintiff Klein in the former action 
is the same person as the defendant Maud E. 
Garcia in the case at bar; that the relationship of 
, attorney and client previously existing between 
plaintiff herein and the defendant Orson Heber 
Matthews was considered and ruled upon in the 
above reported case; and that, in view of the judg-
ment of nonsuit against this plantiff and in favor 
of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, defend-
ant herein, the matters in controversy between 
Cecil B. Matthews, Orson Heber Matthews and 
· Maud E. G·arcia, also known as Maud E. Garcia 
Klein, attempted to be re-li tiga ted in this action, 
were definitely decided and set at rest in the 
former cases. 
14 
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'' 'The judgment of a court of concurrent 
jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, 
a bar, or as eYidence, conclusive, bet,Yeen the same 
parties, upon the same matter directly in question 
in another court.' 15 R. C. L. 951, Sec. 429. 
'' 'The foundation principle upon which the 
doctrine of res juriciata rests is that parties ought 
not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more 
than once; that, when a right or fact has been 
judicially tried and determined by a court. of 
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for 
such trial has been given, the judgment of the 
court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be 
conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity 
''ith them in la'v or estate. * * * Public policy and 
the interest of litigants alike require that there 
be an end to litigatiton, and the peace and order 
of society demand that matters distinctly put in 
issue and deter1nined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction as to parties and subject matter shall 
not be retried bettveen the same parties in any 
subsequent suit in. any court.' 15 R. C. L. 953, 
Sec. 430. '' 
Utah Builders Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86 Utah 250, 
39 Pac. 2d 327. The question involved in the case was 
''Thether a homestead exemption had to be claimed in the 
original case where the propery was sold or whether it 
could be claimed in a subsequent case. While this couit 
held that a homestead right could be claimed in either 
proceeding under our statute it announced the general 
law as follows: 
"It is undoubtedly the general rule, as urged 
by respondent, that a valid judgment for plaintiff 
is concl~tsive not only as to defenses which are set 
up and a.djudicaterl, but also as to those ttvhich 
15 
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might have been raised, so that a defendant can 
neither set up such defense in a second action 
between the same parties nor in a further pro-
ceeding in the same action. Everill v. S"ran, 20 
Utah 56, 57 P. 716; 34 C. J. 856, 859." 
The case of Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Com-
pany is squarely in point on this subject. In that case 
Logan City was attempting to avoid the legal effect of a 
decree construing and interpreting a former adjudication 
of its water rights in Logan River. There, as here, plain-
tiff was attemptitng to contend that there were certain 
issues which were not litigated and determined in the 
former case and that they should have the right to pre-
sent the case upon the changed theory. In both decisions 
this court held that ''the interests of society ·demand that 
there shall be a termination to every controversy" and 
that the plea of res adjudicata was properly sustained. 
In the first decision, 86 Utah 340, 16 Pac. 2d 1097, 
the following language is used : 
'' * * * A leading case supporting such rule is 
that of United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 
61, 65, 25 L. Ed. 93. It is there said that: 
'' 'There are no maxims of the law more firm-
ly established, or of more value in the administra-
tion of justice, than the two which are designed 
to prevent repeated litigation between the same 
parties in regard to the same subject of contro-
versy; namely, interest rei publicae, ut sit finis 
litium, and nemo debet bis vexari pro una et 
eadam causa. 
" 'If the court has been mistaken in the la\v, 
there is a remedy by writ of error. If the jury has 
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been mistaken in the facts, the remedy is by mo-
tion for ne" .. trinl. If there has been evidence dis-
eoYered since the trial, a motion for a new trial 
"""ill give appropriate relief. But all these are 
parts of the same proeeeding, relief is given in the 
same suit, and the party is not vexed by another 
suit for the same matter. So in a suit in chancery 
on proper showing a rehearing is granted. If the 
injury complained of is an erroneous decision, 
an appeal to a higher court gives opportunity to 
correct the error. If new evidence is discovered 
after the decree has become final, a bill of review 
on that ground may be filed within the rules 
prescribed by law on that subject. Here, again, 
these proceedings are ail part of the same suit, 
and the rule framed for the repose of society· is 
not violated. 
'' 'But there is an admitted exception to this 
general rule in cases where, by reason· of some-
thing done by the successful party to a suit, there 
was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the 
issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful party 
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, 
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his 
opponent, as by keeping him away. from court, 
a false promise of a compromise; or where the 
defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being 
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or 
where an attorney fraudulently or without 
authority assumes to represent a party and con-
nives at his defeat; or where the attorney regular-
ly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest 
to the other side--these, and similar cases which 
sho\v that there has never been a real contest in 
the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for 
which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and 
annul the former judgment or deccree, and open 
the case for a new and a fair hearing. See Wells, 
17 
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Res Adjudicata., Sect. 499; Pearce v. Olney, 20 
Conn. 544; Wierich v. DeZoya, 7 Ill. (2 Gilman) 
385; Kent v. Richards, 3 Md. Ch. 392; Smith v. 
Lowry, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 320; DeLouis et al. v. 
Meek et al., 2 Iowa (G. Green), 55 (50 Am. Dee. 
491).' " 
In the decision after rehearing 86 Utah 354, 44 Pac. 
2d. 698, this court announced the law in the following 
language: 
"As to the claimed right of Logan City to 
litigate in the instant case matters which it could 
have litigated in case No. 3055, this court and the 
courts generally are likewise committed to a doc-
trine contrary to plaintiffs' contention. 
In the case of Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah, 
331, 40 P. 206, 208, this court said : 'The defend-
ant can only be called upon to answer the material 
allegations of the complaint, and upon such allega-
tions the- issue is formed, and, when judgment is 
rendered thereon by a court of exclusive juris-
diction, it is conclusive between the parties, upon 
the same rna tters, unless set aside- by a court of 
last resort. And such a judg1nent is final, not 
only as to the matter actually determined, but 
also as to every other matter which might have 
been litigated by the parties, as part of the sub·-
ject in controversy, but uJhich was omitted from 
the case through negligence, or inadvertence, or 
even accident.' '' 
The case of Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 293, 254 Pac. 
784, announces the same law with reference to splitting 
causes of action, in the following language: 
"It is a well-settled rule of law, under both 
common-law and the Code system of pleading, that 
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a party having one entire demand cannot split 
the demand up into separate causes of action. 1 
Sutherland, Code Prar. and Forms, sec. 218; 
('iooley Y- t_lalnvcrns County, 121 Cal. 482, 53 P. 
1075; lr. S. Y. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 65, 25 L. Ed. 
93; 1 C. J. 1006; 1 Van Fleet's Former Adjudi-
cations, 204. In fact, as stated in the case of U. S. 
Y. Throckmorton, supra: 
'' 'There are no maxims of the law more 
firmly established or of more value in the adminis-
tration of justice than the two which are designed 
to prevent repeated litigat1on between the same 
parties in regard to the same subject of contro-
versy, namely: Interest rei publicae, ut sit finis 
litium, and nemo (debet) bis vexa.ri pro una et 
eadem causa.' 
''To this well-established general rule, how-
ever, there are exceptions. If a person by accident, 
excusable neglect, or mistake, or by fraud on the 
part of his adversary and without any fault of the 
pleader, splits a single cause of action, an adjudi-
cation in respect to one will not bar a suit upon the 
other. 1 Van Fleet's Former Adjudications, 206; 
1 C. J. 1009, and cases there cited. If, however, 
the pleader is in possession of the means of ascer-
taining the full extent of his claim, and his failure 
to do so is due to his own fault or neglect, it 
would seem that upon both principle and authority 
the general rule against splitting applies. Macon, 
etc., R. R. Co. v. Gerrard, 54 Ga. 327." 
Plaintiffs in this case did not attempt to bring them-
selves -writhin any exceptions to the general law. They 
simply decided to relitigate the case on a different theory. 
The most recent case on the subject is East Mill 
Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 
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Pac. 2d 863. This case is cited by appellant as authority 
for the idea that res adjudicata applies only to issues 
actually presented and tried. Apparently the case was 
not carefully read or understood by appellants. It is 
authority for no such thing. In fact it sustains the prin-
ciples which defendants contend to be the la\v. That there 
are factual conditions to which the law does not apply 
is granted, but the case at bar is not such a case. The 
Salt Lake City case was such a ease. In that case there 
had been an adjudication between the parties as to the 
rights of the water users under an exchange agreement. 
The prior adjudication had only to do with an interpreta-
tion of the rights during the period prior to the installa-
tion of individual meters. It \vas an action for declara-
tory judgment. Thereafter the meters were installed and 
a further dispute arose as to the interpretation of the 
contract as applied to that situation. The city contended 
that the former declaratory judgment on one phase of the 
case was a bar to any further declaratory judgment re-
lating to the exchange rights. This court very properly 
held that the one declaratory judgment was not conclu-
sive of an issue or controversy which was not in existence 
and which could not hav:e been presented. In doing so 
this court used the language quoted by counsel for plain-
tiffs, which, if lifted from the context of the case, might 
tend to mislead; but when read as applied to that pa.rti-
cular case involving a declaration of rights as applied to 
a pa.rticular dispute is easily understood. In that case 
the general law was again announced by this court in 
most understandable language as follows: 
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''This contention overlooks the fact that there 
are t'Yo kinds of cases where the doctrine of res ju-
dicata is applied: In the one the former action 
is an absolute bar to the ·maintena.nce of the 
second: it usually bars the successf~tl party as well 
as the loser; it must be between the same parties 
or their pril'1:es; it applies not only to points and 
issues which are actually raised a.nd decided there-
in but also to such as co~tld have been therein ad-
judicated, but it only applies where the claim, 
demand or cause of action is the same in both 
cases. The courts hold that the parties should liti-
gate their entire claim, demand and cause of ao-
tion, and every part, issue and ground thereof, and 
if one of the parties fails to raise any p~oint or 
issue or to litigate any part of his claim, demand 
or cause of action a;nd the matter goes to fina.l 
judgment, such party may not aga.in litigate that 
claim, demand or cause of action or any issue, 
point or part thereof which he could have but 
failed to litigate in the former action. On the other 
hand where the claim, demand, or cause of action 
is different in the two cases then the former is 
res judicata of the latter only to the extent that 
the former actually raised and decided the same 
points and issues which are raised in the latter. 
Harding Company v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417, 186 
N. E. 152, 88 A.L.R. 563, and note thereto; Outram 
v. Morewood, 3 East 346, 102 Eng. Reprint 630; 
Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 
195, 30 Am. Jur. 923; 'Judgments', section 179 
and 180; 38 Yale Law Journal (1928-29) 299, at 
311 'Res Judicata' by Robert von Moschzisker. 
This distinction has been followed by this court 
although not expressly pointed out. Everill v. 
Swan, 20 Utah 56, 57 P. 716; Glen Allen Mining 
Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 
P. 231; Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. 2d 699; 
Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 86 Utah 
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340, 16 P. 2d 1097, on rehearing, 86 Utah 354, 44 P. 
2d 698; State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, at page 422, 
120 P. 2d 285, at page 315." 
If the law of this State were as contended for by 
plaintiff every plaintiff or defendant in any case involv-
ing property or personal injuries could reli tiga te his case 
by simply adding a new theory or changing his position 
regardless of the legal ethics involved. It would open the 
door to confusion and chicanery. 
There are some other cases from this court whicb. we 
refrain from citing because they add nothing to what 
has been so recently reiterated by this court. There are, 
however, some decisions from other jurisdictions which 
apply to factual conditions similar to the case at bar. 
We cite them as added authority. Daluiso v. Nicassio, 
(Cal.) 107 Pac. 2d 460: 
Action filed in 1935 alleging that plaintiff and de-
fendant orally agreed to go into partnership in building 
and operation of a winery and asked for ''an adjudica-
tion of the existence of the said co-partnership and of the 
respective rights" of the parties for a dissolution and 
accounting, and other and further relief. Defendant 
denied all claims and set up an affirmative defense show-
ing a written agreement constituting full satisfaction of 
·all claims against him. The court found that the allega-
tions of the affirmative defense were true. In 1936 plain-
. tiff filed another action whereby he sought to recover 
$8000.00 for services and material furnished during the 
course of said alleged co-partnership, on the basis that 
he had mistakenly believed that he was a partner of the 
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defendant. Other causes of (H·tion sought rpeovcry on 
quantum meruit and aeeounts stated. The meaning a11d 
effect of the aforesaid \Yritten agreement \vas attempted 
to be put into issue. The court said : 
··:\I oreover, the meaning and a.ff ect of that 
agreement has been adjudicated in another action 
\Yhere the same result \vas reached. In l)rice v. 
Sixth Dist. Agricultural .A.ss 'u., 201 Cal 502, 238 
P. 387, 390, the court quotes '"·ith approval from 
Freeman on Judgments as follo,vs : 'If the exist-
ence, validity or construction of a contract, lease, 
conveyanee or other obligation has been adjudi-
cated in one action it is res judicata when it comes 
again in issue in another action betvveen the same 
parties, though the immediate subject-matter of 
the t\vo actions be different.' The court then said : 
In other words, when an issue has been litigated 
all inquiry respecting the same is foreclosed, not 
only as to matters heard, but also as to matters 
that could have been heard in support of or 111 
opposition thereto.' '' 
Poarch et ai v. Finkelstein, (Okla.) 99 Pac. 2d 871: 
Where, in an injunction suit, the ovvnership of thP 
personar property is made an issue under the pleadings, 
and that issue along with the question of right to injunc-
tive relief is litigated on the trial, and it is finally de-
cided that the writ \vas wrongfully issued, it is not error 
in an action between the same parties on the injunction 
bond to exclude testimony of the defendants therein rela-
tive to the ownership of the property in issue in the in-
junction case. 
" 'When a fact has been determined in the 
course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judg·-
ment has been rendered in accordance there\vith, 
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it cannot be again litigated between the same 
parties wthout virtually impeaching the correct-
ness of the former decision, which, from motives 
of public policy, the law does not permit to be 
done. rrhe estoppel is not confined to the judg-
ment, hut extends to all facts involved in it as 
necessary steps or the groundwork upon which 
it must haYe been founded. It is allowable to rea-
son back from a judgment to the basis on which it 
stands, upon the obvious principle that, where a 
conclusion is indisputable and could have been 
dra\Yn only from certain premises, the premises 
are equally indisputable with the conclusion. 
,Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okl. 308, 168 P. 1031; Adams 
v. State ex rel. l\1othersead, Bartk Com'r, 133 Okl. 
194, 271 ·p. 946.' '' 
Rn1ith v. Schuler-I{nox Co., (Cal.) 192 Pac. 2d 34: 
Plaintiffs realty \vas purchased at an execution sale 
111 satisfaction of a judgment and judgment rendered 
against plaintiffs in purchasers quiet title suit; plain-
tiff's right of redemption and to any moneys previously 
expended for improvements while plaintiffs retained pos-
session were interests in the realty "\vhich should have 
been alleged and proved, and failure to do so constituted 
a \Yaiver of the issues ancl judgment was res judicata as 
to such issues. 
''It has been repeatedly determined that res 
judie a ta applies not only to the issues which were 
actually pleaded and determined by the former 
judgment, but also to all issues which could have 
been properly tendered and determined thereby. 
(Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 864, 868, 
137 P. 2d 713; De Hart v. Allen, 26 Cal. 2d 829, 161 
P. 2d 453; l{rier v. l{rier, 28 Cal. 2d 841, 172 P. 
2d 681; Brunswig Drug Co. v. Springer, 66 Cal. 
A.pp. 2d 444, 450, 130 P. 2d 7fj8.) 
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''
1hat w·e haYe stated also disposes of the citations 
contained in plaintiffs brief . 
. A ..s to the citation from 30 Am. Juris. 946 with reference 
to misconception of remedy, we simply say that plaintiffs 
did not misconceive any remedy. They wanted their 
money back because they did not want to go ahead with 
the deal and they brought an action for breach of con-
tract, which they could not prove. They made certain al-
legations "rith reference to the contract, what it was, and 
what the relationship of the parties was, and particularly 
alleged the partnership matter. Defendant did likewise, 
and thereafter the partnership matter was tried and 
adjudicated; and then they tried to bring the second case 
upon a completely different. allegation as to the effect of 
the same contract and the same transaction. That hasn't 
anything to do with a misconception of remedy and a 
reading of the cases in the foot note discloses no such 
authority for the proposition plaintiffs attempted in 
this case. 
We respectfully submit that the plea of res adjudi-
cata was properly interposed and the trial court was 
correct in its ruling overrulling the demurrer and in 
denying the motion to strike. If plaintiffs ever had any 
remedy it was by motion for new trial and ap·peal in the 
original case. It certainly was not by refiling. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH AND ELTON, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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